Toma en cuenta las diferentes etapas del proceso electoral, desde laĬonstrucción y actualización del registro electoral hasta la transmisión y consolidación de los resultados electorales. La ponencia delinea de las algunas posibilidades que la automatización y la informatización ofrecen para la modernización de los diferentes procesos electorales en Latinoamérica. In contrast, constructivist political change is necessarily competitive, which makes such change less intrinsically related to longer-term emergent benefits to social ordering. This is because dynamic economic forces (which operate through mutually beneficial exchange) can disrupt political economic equilibria. Through the analysis of the emergence of the Australian ballot and the general corporate form in the 19th Century US, I argue that public economic institutional change is a process more tractable to constructivist influence. In contrast, while the public definition of economic institutions is also governed by political self-interest, economic dynamics can redefine this political self-interest in socially beneficial ways. Because of the structural way in which changes to political rules result in distributional consequences compared to the political status quo, their emergence is fundamentally governed by the dynamics of political self-interest.
But not all institutions emerge from the same processes of spontaneous ordering self-interest subject to market discipline looks very different than self interest subject to political discipline. All rights reserved.ĭefining rules politically poses the general question of which aspects of social ordering are tractable to public institutional resolution. © 2017 by the Southern Political Science Association. Our findings imply that less complicated voting procedures can affect the composition of legislative representation and manufacture a more inclusive legislature. We find that precincts casting electronic ballots under an Australian ballot, rather than the ballot-and-envelope system, have significantly higher rates of ballot splitting. This empirical strategy allows us to treat our data as a quasi-experiment. We use the Geographic Information System to reconstruct precinct demographics and matching to address threats to random assignment. Exploiting data from three elections and a novel ballot reform in Salta, Argentina - electronic voting was incrementally introduced over multiple elections - we provide an empirical analysis of how ballot structure influences ballot splitting. We argue that changes in ballot structure imposed by electronic voting, implemented under the exact same electoral rules, can facilitate ballot splitting. Although a growing number of countries have implemented electronic voting, few scholars have considered the unintended consequences of such reforms.
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